Abstract-Traditional unreliable failure detectors are per process oracles that provide a list of nodes suspected of having failed. In [1], we introduced the Impact failure detector that outputs a trust level value which is the degree of confidence in the system. An impact factor is assigned to each node and an input threshold parameter defines an impact factor limit value, over which the confidence degree on the system is ensured. The impact factor indicates the relative importance of the process in the set S, while the threshold offers a degree of flexibility for failures and false suspicions. We propose in this article two different algorithms, based on query-response message rounds, that implement the Impact FD whose conceptions were tailored to satisfy the Impact FD's flexibility. The first one exploits the time-free message pattern approach while the second one considers a set of bounded timely responses. We also introduced the concept that a process can be P S−accessible (or ♦P S−accessible) which guarantees that the system S will always (or eventually always) be trusted by this process as well as two properties, P R(IT S * p ) and P R(♦IT S * p ), that characterize the stability conditions which ensure the confidence (or eventual confidence) of process p on S. In both implementations, if the process that monitors S is P S−accessible or ♦P S−accessible, at every query round, it only waits (or eventually only waits) for a set of responses that satisfy the threshold. A crucial facet of this set of processes is that it is not fixed, i.e., the set of processes can change at each round, which is in accordance with the flexibility feature of the Impact FD.
Introduction
There are several important works in the literature concerning unreliable fault detectors (FDs). A FD can informally be seen as a per process oracle which, when invoked, provides information, not always correct, about processes liveness [2] .
In [1] , we introduced the Impact failure detector. In contrast with traditional unreliable failure detectors [3] [4] that output the set of nodes suspected of having failed, the Impact FD outputs a trust level concerning a given system S. The output can be considered as the degree of confidence in the system. To this end, an impact factor, that is defined by the user, is assigned to each node and the trust level is equal to the sum of the impact factors of the trusted nodes, i.e., those nodes not suspected of failure. Furthermore, an input threshold parameter defines a lower bound value, over which the confidence degree on S is ensured. The impact factor indicates the relative importance of the process in the set S, while the threshold offers a degree of flexibility for failures and false suspicions, thus allowing a higher tolerance of instability in the system. We should point out, the Impact FD configuration allows nodes of S to be grouped into subsets and threshold values can be defined for each of these subsets. In addition, similarly to the traditional FD, several classes of Impact FDs can be defined depending on their capability of suspecting faulty processes (completeness property) and of not suspecting correct processes (accuracy property).
We consider "trusted" the expectation that a system will behave in a particular manner for a specific purpose even in the face of failures, i.e., the system is able to maintain the normal functionality. For instance, in an unstable network, although there might be many false suspicions, depending on the value assigned to the threshold, the system can remain trustworthy [5] . Hence, upon invoking the Impact FD, an application can know whether the system S is trusted or not by comparing the trust level value returned by the FD with the threshold value.
Having the above characteristics, the Impact FD can be applied to systems that have the following features: (1) applications that execute on them are interested on information about the reliability of the system as a whole and can tolerate a certain margin of failures. The latter may vary depending on the environment, situation, or context, such as systems that provide redundancy of software/hardware; (2) systems that organize nodes with some common characteristic into groups; (3) systems where the nodes can have different importance (relevance) or roles and, thus, their failures may have distinct impact on the system. All these features of the Impact FD characterize its capability in being flexible which is the object of this article.
The flexibility property of the Impact FD expresses the capability of the Impact FD to tolerate a certain margin of failures or false suspicions, i.e., its potential of providing different sets of responses that lead to a trusted state of S. This article, thus, presents two different implementations for the Impact FD (and their respective proofs of correctness), tailored to satisfy the flexibility property. Both of them use query-response message rounds. The first one is based on the time-free message pattern approach [6] which does not assume bounds on process and communication delays but the relative speed among messages. A process p broadcasts a query message to the nodes of S that it monitors and then waits for responses from α processes or from a set Q of processes whose response satisfies the threshold. In the second approach, p can receive responses to its broadcast query from a set of processes within a bounded delay (timely responses) and the responses of this set of processes can (eventually) satisfy the threshold.
In such context, we define two properties, P R(IT )
S p and P R(♦IT )
S p , which characterize the conditions that ensures the confidence (or eventual confidence) of the monitor process p in system S. In other words, if P R(IT ) S p (resp., P R(♦IT ) S p ) holds, the system S is always (resp., eventually always) trusted by the monitor process p.
Furthermore, inspired in [7] , we also introduce in this article the concept of P S−accessibility and ♦P S−accessibility: a correct process p is P S−accessible (resp., ♦P S−accessible) if every query broadcast by p obtains from the beginning (resp., eventually) a set Q of responses that satisfy the degree of confidence in S, i.e., the trust level of S is greater or equal than the threshold value. In the case of the message pattern approach, this property implies that a query broadcast by p receives responses from a set of processes Q which satisfy the threshold and these responses are always (resp., eventually always) winning responses, i.e., arrive before the other responses. In the case of the timer-based approach, there exists a set Q of processes that satisfy the threshold and a query broadcast by p always (or eventually always) receives timely (i.e., within a known bounded delay) responses from each process of Q. Interestingly that in both implementations the set Q of processes is not fixed, i.e., it can change at each query, which is in accordance with the flexibility property of the Impact FD. This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents some distributed systems, applications or comparison with existing works that motivated the Impact FD proposal. Section 3 outlines some basic concepts of unreliable failure detectors while Section 4 describes the system model. Section 5 introduces the Impact failure detector and its properties. Section 6 presents two algorithms for the implementation of the Impact FD as well as their proofs of correctness. In Section 7 we discuss some existing related work. Finally, Section 8 concludes the paper and outlines some future research directions.
Motivation
Among many systems to which the Impact FD can be applied, we highlight, for instance, (1) wireless sensor networks (WSNs) that monitor environment conditions, (2) large-scale WSNs which group sensor nodes into clusters for scalability and resource saving reasons, and (3) replicated servers that offer some quality of service (QoS) such as bandwidth or response time.
In the first example, where WSN is used to collect environmental data, the monitored area can be divided into management zones in accordance with different characteristics. Each zone comprises sensors of different types (e.g., humidity control, temperature control, etc.) and the density of the sensors depends on the characteristics of each zone. That is, the number of sensors can be different for each type of sensor within a given zone. Furthermore, the redundancy of the sensors ensures both area coverage and connectivity in case of failure. Each management zone can thus be viewed as a single set which has sensors of the same type grouped into subsets. This grouping approach allows a threshold to be defined: it mus be equal to the minimum number of sensors that each subset must have to keep the connectivity and application functioning all the time.
In the environment of the second WSN example, each cluster i is composed by several sensor nodes (SNs) and a special one denoted cluster head (CH), which routes SNs' messages to other clusters. The failure of an CH compromises network connectivity. On the other hand, when the number of alive SNs drops below a threshold, additional resources must be deployed. The concept of Impact FD can be applied to such networks by considering each cluster i of size n i as a subset of the system S, assigning a higher impact factor to the CH than to the the SNs (e.g., I CHi = n i and I SN = 1, respectively), and a threshold value that expresses both the relevance of the CH and the maximum number of SN failures, f i , tolerated at each cluster i (e.g.,
The third example concerns a set of servers where, if the primary one, that offers some quality of service fails, n backup servers could replace it, provided that they, together, offer the same (or higher) quality of service than the former. In such a scenario, the impact factor value of the main server or the sum of the impact factors of the backup servers must be greater or equal than the threshold value. If this holds, the system will always be trusted, offering the expected QoS.
In order to strengthen even more the motivation of the Impact FD conception, we should also refer the work of Junqueira et al. in [8] . Arguing that traditional approaches which assume a maximum number of failures f may lead to suboptimal solutions, such as in replication protocols where the number of replicas depend on f , the authors propose the survivor sets, i.e., the unique collection of minimal sets of correct processes over all executions, each set containing all correct processes of some execution. The principle of the Impact FD also follows the authors' arguments: the number of failures tolerated by the system is not necessarily fixed but depends on sets of correct processes, their respective impact factors, and threshold value. For instance, the timer-based implementation presented in Section 6.2 does not explicitly depend on the number of failures. Note that the Impact FD threshold/impact factor approach is strictly more powerful than the maximum number of failures f approach since the latter can be expressed with the former but not the other way around.
Circumventing the impossibility of consensus in asynchronous systems in presence of failures and performance issues were also concerns when the conception of the Impact FD. Therefore, we showed in [9] that some classes of the Impact FD are equivalent to the Omega Ω and Sigma Σ FD classes. These equivalences are extremely important since Ω (resp., the pair Ω, Σ ) is the weakest failure detector that solves the consensus in asynchronous distributed systems with a majority of correct processes (resp., any number of failures) if the system is enriched by them. Consequently, some failure detectors of Impact FD classes can be these detectors. Moreover, based on real trace files collected from nodes of PlanetLab [10] , we presented in [1] [9] some performance evaluation results which compare the Impact FD with Chen et al's FD [3] . The results confirmed the degree of flexible applicability of the Impact FD, that both failures and false suspicions are more tolerated than in traditional FDs, and that Impact FD presents better Qos than the Chen's FD if the application is interested in the degree of confidence in the system (trust level) as a whole.
Finally, it is worth pointing out that the Impact FD is interestingly suitable for anonymous and homonymous systems since its output (trust level) does not depend on the identifier of the processes.
Unreliable Failure Detectors
An important abstraction for the development of fault tolerant distributed systems is the unreliable failure detector [2] . The aim of the latter is to encapsulate the uncertainty of the communication delay between two distributed entities.
An unreliable FD can be seen as an oracle that gives (not always correct) information about process failures (either trusted or suspected). It usually provides a list of processes suspected of having crashed. In addition, a failure detection system consists of local modules in which each machine may monitor a group or subgroup of system processes, or even be monitored by other detectors.
According to [11] , unreliable FDs are so named because they can make mistakes (1) by erroneously suspecting a correct process (false suspicion), or (2) by not suspecting a process that has actually crashed. If the FD detects its mistake later, it corrects it. For instance, a FD can stop suspecting at time t + 1, a process that it suspected at time t. Although the unreliable FDs can not accurately determine the real state of processes, using them increases knowledge about the processes of the system [2] . This means that the aim of an unreliable FD is to encapsulate the uncertainty of the communication delay between two distributed entities.
Unreliable failure detectors are characterized by two properties, completeness and accuracy, as defined in [2] . Completeness characterizes the failure detector's capability of suspecting faulty processes, while accuracy characterizes the failure detector's capability of not suspecting correct processes, i.e., restricts the mistakes that the failure detector can make. FDs are then classified according to two completeness properties and four accuracy properties [2] .
Notice that the type of accuracy depends on the synchronism or stability of the network. For instance, a strong accuracy requires a synchronous system while an eventual strong one relies on a partially synchronous system which eventually ensures a bound for message transmission delays and processes' speed.
Implementation of Failure Detectors
The literature has several proposals for implementing unreliable failure detectors which usually exploit either a timer-based or a message-pattern approach.
In the timer-based strategy, FD implementations make use of timers to detect failures in processes. Every process q periodically sends a control message (heartbeat) to process p that is responsible for monitoring q. If p does not receive such a message from q after the expiration of a timer, it adds q to its list of suspected processes.
The message-pattern strategy does not use any mechanism of timeout. In [6] , the authors propose an implementation that uses a request-response mechanism. A process p sends a QU ERY message to n nodes that it monitors and then waits for responses (RESP message) from α processes (α ≤ n, traditionally α = n − f , where f is the maximum number of failures). A query issued by p ends when it has received α responses. The other responses, if any, are discarded and the respective processes are suspected of having failed. A process sends QU ERY messages repeatedly if it has not failed. If, on the next request-response, p receives a response from a suspected process q, then p removes q from its list of suspects. This approach considers the relative order for the receiving messages and that one (or a set of nodes) always (or after a time) answers faster to the QU ERY than the other nodes.
System Model
In this work, we consider that there is one process by node (site) or sensor. Thus, the word process can also mean either a node, a sensor, or a site. We consider a distributed system which consists of a finite set of uniquely identified processes S = {q 1 , . . . , q n } with |S| = n.
Processes communicate by sending and receiving messages over bi-directional reliable links, i.e., links that do not lose, duplicate or corrupt messages and never generate spurious messages.The network is assumed to be fully connected,
The system model is asynchronous. It is important to point out that an asynchronous system is characterized by the absence of bounds on process speed and on message delay. It is impossible to distinguish with certainty a crashed process from a very slow process in a purely asynchronous distributed system. Thus, for the two proposed implementations, the asynchronous system is enriched with new assumptions about synchrony of the links/processes or the relative speed between links.
Processes in S fail by crashing and do not recover. We define a correct process the one which never fails during the whole execution; otherwise it is faulty. We assume the existence of some global time denoted T . A failure pattern is a function F : T → 2 S , where F (t) is the set of processes that have failed before or at time t. Besides S, we consider a correct process p that monitors S. The function correct(F ) denotes the set of correct processes of S ∪ {p}, i.e., those that have never belonged to a failure pattern (F ), while faulty(F ) denotes the set of faulty processes of S, i.e., the complement of correct(F ).
Impact Failure Detector
The Impact FD can be defined as an unreliable failure detector that provides an output related to the trust level with regard to a set of processes. If the trust level provided by the detector, is equal to, or greater than, a given threshold value, defined by the user, the confidence in the set of processes is ensured. We can thus say that the system is trusted. We denote FD (I p S ) the Impact failure detector module of process p that monitors system S. When invoked in p, the Impact FD (I p S ) returns the trust level p S value which expresses the confidence that p has in the set S.
Each process q ∈ S has an impact factor
Notice that the grouping feature of the Impact FD allows the processes of S to be partitioned into disjoint subsets, in accordance with a particular criterion. For instance, in a scenario where there are different types of sensors, those of the same type can be gathered in the same subset. Let then S * = {S * 1 , S * 2 , ...S * m } be the set S partitioned into m disjoint subsets where each S * i is a set composed of the tuple id, I , where id is a process identifier and I is the value of the impact factor of the process in question. 
The threshold S * is used by p to check the confidence in the processes of S. If, for each subset of S * , the trust level i (t) ≥ threshold i , S is considered to be trusted at t by p, i.e., the confidence of p in S has not been compromised; otherwise S is considered untrusted by p at t.
Three points should be emphasized: (1) both the impact factor and threshold S * render the estimation of the confidence in S flexible. For instance, it is possible that some processes in S might be faulty or suspected of being faulty but S is still trusted; (2) the Impact FD can be easily configured to adapt to the needs of the environment; (3) the threshold S * can be tuned to provide a more restricted or softer monitoring. Note that the Impact FD can also be applied when the application needs individual information about each process of S. In this case, each process must be defined as a different subset of S * . In Table 1 , we consider a set S * composed by three subsets: S * 1 , S * 2 , and S * 
Flexibility of the Impact FD
The flexibility of the Impact FD characterizes its capability in accepting different set of responses that lead to a trusted state of S. We define P S as the set that contains all possible subsets of processes which satisfy a defined threshold:
where ×S i corresponds to the cartesian product of several sets.
Initially, the TPowerSet function generates the power set 1 for each subset (S i * ) of S * . Then, only the subsets of S i * whose sum of their parts is greater than, or equal to, threshold i are selected. That is, the output is the sets of possible trusted set that satisfy the threshold for each subset S i * . Following this, the cartesian product is applied to generate all possible combinations, i.e., all the generated subsets of processes satisfy the threshold S * . Let's consider the following example: 
Some properties
Similarly to many existing works (see Section 7), we define some properties and process/link behaviors in order to introduce some synchrony on the asynchronous system.
Considering the set P S, which characterizes the flexibility of the Impact FD, we define the following properties:
Impact Threshold Property -P R(IT )
S p : For a failure detector of a correct process p, the set trusted p S is always a subset of P S.
For a failure detector of a correct process p, there is a time after which the set trusted p S is always a subset of P S.
Inspired by the concept that a process is ♦f −accessible proposed in [7] (see Section 7), we also define the concept of a P S−accessible and a ♦P S−accessible process:
A process p ∈ correct(F ) is P S−accessible (resp., ♦P S−accessible) if every QU ERY message broadcast by p obtains from the beginning (resp., eventually) a set Q of responses that satisfy the threshold S * .
1 the power set of any set S is the set of all subsets of S, including the empty set and S itself Thus, if p is P S−accessible (resp., ♦P S−accessible), P R(IT ) S p (resp., P R(♦IT ) S p ) holds for p. We have then the following definitions for the message pattern and timer-based approaches:
Message-pattern approach: Given a query issued by p, the set of first RESP messages received by p to this query are denoted winning responses [6] , [12] .
A process process p ∈ correct(F ) is P S−accessible (resp., ♦P S−accessible) if for τ 0 = 0 (resp., ∃τ 0 ) ∀τ ≥ τ 0 , there exists a set Q(τ ) of processes such that Q(τ ) ∈ P S and p / ∈ Q(τ ) and a QU ERY message broadcast by p at τ receives RESP messages from processes of Q(τ ) and these responses are always (resp., eventually always) winning responses.
Timer-based approach: A process p ∈ correct(F ) is P S−accessible (resp., ♦P S−accessible) if for τ 0 = 0 (resp., ∃τ 0 ) ∀τ ≥ τ 0 , there exists a set Q of processes such that Q(τ ) ∈ P S and p / ∈ Q(τ ) and a QU ERY message broadcast by p at τ receives a RESP message from each process of Q(τ ) by time τ + δ.
We should point out that in both definitions of P S−accessible and ♦P S−accessible, the set Q(τ ) is not fixed and can be different at distinct times which is in accordance with the flexibility property of the Impact FD.
Implementations of the Impact FD
In this section we present two different implementations of the Impact FD: the first one is based on the messagepattern approach and the second one on the timer-based approach. Both of them use query-response message rounds and were conceived to exploit the flexibility capacity of the Impact FD.
In Section 5 we introduced the concept that if process p is P S−accessible (or ♦P S−accessible) the system S will always (or eventually always) be trusted by p as well as two properties, P R(IT )
S p and P R(♦IT )
S p , that characterize the necessary stability condition of S that ensures confidence (or eventual confidence) on it.
A correct process p is P S−accessible (resp., ♦P S−accessible) if every query broadcast by p obtains from the beginning (resp., eventually) a set Q of responses that satisfy the degree of confidence in S, i.e., the trust level of S is greater or equal than the threshold value. In the case of the message pattern approach, this property implies that a query broadcast by p receives responses from a set of processes Q whose sum of impact factors satisfy the threshold and these responses are always (resp., eventually always) winning responses, i.e., arrive before the other responses. In the case of the timer-based approach, there exists a set Q of processes whose sum of impact factors satisfies the threshold and a query broadcast by p always (or eventually always) receives timely (i.e., within a known bounded delay) responses from each process of Q. Interestingly that in both implementations the set Q of processes is not fixed, i.e., can change at each round, which is in accordance with the flexibility property of the Impact We consider that the monitor process p ∈ correct(F ) and p / ∈ S. It repeatedly issues queries by calling the primitive broadcast(m) which sends a copy of the QU ERY message over every link from p to q, ∀q ∈ S. The time interval between two consecutive rounds of QU ERY messages is finite and arbitrary (resp., bounded) for the message pattern (resp., timer-based) implementation. The reception of the QUERY message is handled, for both implementations, by Algorithm 1 (Task T1), which is executed by every process q ∈ S. Upon reception of (QUERY, r p ) message, where r p is the round identifier (line 2), q responds to p with a RESP message, identified by the same round value r p (line 3). Upon reception of (QU ERY, r p ) from p do 3: send(RESP, r p ) to p 4:
Both algorithms (message-pattern and timer-based) use the following variables:
• trusted, tmp trusted: sets that keep those processes considered not faulty by the monitor process p; • PS: set composed of all possible subsets of processes, whose sum of their impact factor values are equal or greater than threshold S * p . We also point out that, since the two algorithms have S * as input, they know S, the impact factor of all processes of S, the number of subgroups |S * |, and how processes are grouped.
Message-pattern Implementation
Algorithm 2 presents the message pattern approach implementation of the Impact FD of process p with respect to S.
Process p receives S * , the threshold value of each subset of S * (the set threshold S * ), and the maximum number of messages to wait (α). The latter is a set α = {α 1 , . . . , α m }, where each α i corresponds to a bound value on the number of messages to wait from the processes of subset S * i . For instance, if f i denotes the maximum number of failures of processes of subset
The algorithm has three tasks. At the initialization, trusted is initialized with the processes of S and both r p and tmp trusted are reset. Then, the function T P owerSet is carried out to generate the set P S which contains all possible subsets formed by processes of S that satisfy the threshold S * . The variable tmp trusted, at every query round, gathers the identifier and impact factor of those processes that answered to the current query. 
trusted = tmp trusted 14: tmp trusted = ∅ 15: r p = r p + 1 16: end loop Task T2 17: Upon reception of (RESP, r q ) from q do 18: if r q = r p then 19: tmp trusted ∪ {q} 20: end if Task T2 is responsible for the reception of messages (RESP, r q ) sent by a process q of S. If the round r q value of the RESP message is equal to r p , then q is added to the tmp trusted q set.
Task T3 handles the invocation of the Impact() function (line 22), which computes and return the trust level related to the trusted processes (line 23). Proof. The only point that p could block forever would be in the wait statement of Task T1 (line 12).
Let's consider round r p and that the system is blocked in the wait statement. Let's also suppose that the system is trusted in round r and that the set tmp trusted by Task T2 within round r p is also included in P S. In this case, the second condition of the wait becomes true and T 1 will not block. Let's now suppose that p is blocked on the wait statement and that the second condition does not hold, i.e., p will not be unblocked because of it. However, for every subset S * i , p waits for α i messages (1 ≤ i ≤ m) , where f i is the maximum number of processes of S * i that can fail and α i ≤ |S * i | − f i . Therefore, as the channels are reliable and, even if f i nodes of each S * i have failed, p will receive α i responses (1 ≤ i ≤ m) which will render the first condition true, and p will be unblocked. In other words, since α i is bounded and no query or response messages are lost, such a condition always ensures the progress of the failure detector. Proof. From Lemma 1, task T1 never blocks. Let's consider a process q that crashes. Then, after some time t after the crash of q, all the RESP messages sent by q before it crashed have been received or discarded by p. Thus, after t, p will no more receive any RESP message from q and, therefore, q will never be included again in tmp trusted after the latter was reset in a round at or after t (line 14). Consequently, there exists a time after t which q will permanently not in tmp trusted and, consequently, not in trusted, i.e., q is permanently suspected. Since the same reasoning can be applied to all faulty processes, every process that crashed eventually permanently will not belong to trusted and, thus, strong completeness is satisfied.
Lemma 2.
At every query r p issued by p, trusted is updated with the identifier of winning processes which respond to query r p .
Proof. From Lemma 1, task T1 never blocks and, thus, line 13 is always executed. This line is the only point where trusted is updated with tmp trusted after initialization (line 5). Furthermore, tmp trusted is set to empty at every query (line 14) and only processes whose response concerns query r p are added to tmp trusted at round r p (lines 18 -19) at task T2. Hence, at every query round r p , trusted is updated with the identifiers of winning processes which respond to query r p .
Proof. For t = 0, trusted = S. Let Q(r) be the set of winning responses at round r and r 0 be the first round such that trusted = tmp trusted ∈ P S. Let then consider that ∀r ≥ r 0 , for every Q(r), trusted ∈ P S which characterize the P S−accessibility of p. In this case, since from Lemma 2, trusted is updated at every query round with the identifiers of processes of Q(r), trusted = tmp trusted ∈ P S. Let t be the time when trusted is updated in round r 0 (line 5 or line 13). Therefore, ∀t ≥ t, when the impact FD is invoked, P R(IT ) S p (resp., P R(♦IT ) S p ) holds.
Theorem 2. Let trust level
S * p (t) be the output value returned by Algorithm 2 at t. If p is P S−accessible (resp.,
Proof. The proof follows directly from Lemma 3.
Timer-based Implementation
Algorithm 3 shows a timer-based implementation of the Impact FD of process p with respect to S. The latter includes the assumption that there exists a known upper bound δ on the round-trip delay of messages, but it might not hold on all pairs of processes at all times. Processes are considered synchronous and process p issues a query periodically at every Δ units of time (Δ > δ).
Process p monitors the processes of S and receives as input the set S * , the threshold S * , the interval time Δ to send the broadcast message, and the upper bound δ on the round-trip delay of messages for timely links.
If p ∈ correct(F ) is P S−accessible (resp., ♦P S−accessible), it always (resp. eventually always) receives RESP messages, in a delay of time smaller than δ, from a set Q of processes whose impact factors ensure that the respective trusted ∈ P S.
The algorithm has four tasks. At the initialization, trusted is initialized with the processes of S. Then, the function T P owerSet is carried out to generate the set P S which contains all possible subsets formed by processes of S that satisfy the threshold S * (line 7). The variables r p and timer timeout are also initialized.
At every round r p , Task T1 of p reset tmp trusted and increments the round counter (lines 10-11). Periodically (interval of Δ time units), process p sends to the processes in S a QU ERY message (line 12) and starts the timer timeout (line 13).
In Task T2, when process p receives a RESP message sent by q, if round r q is equal to r p and q is not in tmp trusted, q is added to tmp trusted (line 15). At this point, if tmp trusted is a subset of P S (i.e., contains processes whose sum of impact factor values satisfy the threshold S * ) (line 18), than the variable tmp trusted is assigned to trusted and the timeout is stopped.
Task T3 is the same of Algorithm 2. It handles the invocation of the Impact() function by p, which returns the sum of impact factor of the trusted processes (line 24).
Upon expiration of the timer timeout (Task T4), p assigns its current knowledge about trusted processes (i.e., tmp trusted) to trusted. 
Task T1 -Repeat forever every Δ time unit 10: tmp trusted = ∅
11:
r p = r p + 1 12: broadcast(QU ERY, r p )
13:
start timeout Task T2 14:
Upon reception of (RESP, r q ) from q do 15: if r q = r p then 16: tmp trusted ∪ {q} 17: end if 18: if tmp trusted ∈ P S then Proof. At every new query r p in task T1, p starts a timer (line 13). Furthermore, tmp trusted is set to empty at every query and only processes whose response is timestamped with r p is added to tmp trusted at round r p at task T2. As Δ > δ, a new query will not be issued before the timer expires or is stopped. If the set of Q RESP messages received by this query are such that Q ∈ P S, the timer is stopped and trusted = tmp trusted = Q by Task T2 (lines 19 -20) . Otherwise, the timer will expires (Task T4) and trusted will be updated with tmp trusted set which contains the identifiers of processes that sent RESP messages related to query r p (line 27) within a delay of δ.
Proof. From Lemma 4, trusted is updated at every query. Let t 0 ∈ T . For every query QU ERY message broadcast by p at t ≥ t 0 , it receives a RESP message from processes of a set Q of processes such that trusted ∈ P S within t+δ. In this case, the timer started in every query at line 13 will never expire and, therefore, Task T4 will be never executed ∀t ≥ t. On the other hand, since at t, trusted ∈ P S, the test of line 18 is always true. Hence ∀t ≥ t, when the impact FD is invoked P R(IT ) S p (resp., P R(♦IT ) S p ) holds for p.
Theorem 4. Let trust level
S * p (t) be the output value returned by Algorithm 3 at t. If p is P S−accessible (resp.,
Proof. The proof follows directly from Lemma 5.
Related Work
We can divide related studies of the literature into two groups: (1) unreliable failures detectors and (2) works which consider additional assumptions for asynchronous systems.
Unreliable failure detectors: Most of the unreliable failure detectors in the literature are based on a binary model and provide as output a set of process identifiers, which usually informs the set of processes currently suspected of having failed ( [2] [4]). However, in some detectors, such as class Σ (resp., Ω) [13] , the output is the set of processes (resp., one process) which are (resp., is) not suspected of being faulty, i.e., trusted.
The φ Accrual failure detector [14] proposes an approach where the output is a suspicion level on a continuous scale, rather than providing information of a binary nature (trusted or suspected). It is based on an estimation of interarrival time assuming that the latter follows a normal distribution. The suspicion level captures the degree of confidence with which a given process is believed to have crashed. If the process actually crashes, the value is guaranteed to accrue over time and tends toward infinity. In [15] , the authors extended the Accrual FD by exploiting histogram density estimation. Taking into account a sampled inter-arrival time and the time of the last received heartbeat, the algorithm estimates the probability that no further heartbeat messages arrive from a given process, i.e., it has failed. The aim of Accrual failure detectors is to decouple monitoring from interpretation.
Starting from the premise that applications should have information about failures to take specific and suitable recovery actions, the work in [16] proposes a service to report faults to applications. The latter also encapsulates uncertainty which allows applications to proceed safely in the presence of doubt. The service provides status reports related to fault detection with an abstraction that describes the degree of uncertainty.
Considering that each node has a probability of being byzantine, a voting node redundancy approach is presented in [17] in order to improve reliability of distributed systems. Based on such probability values, the authors estimate the minimum number of machines that the system should have in order to provide a degree of reliability which is equal to or greater than a threshold value.
In [18] , the authors propose the use of a reputation mechanism to implement failure detectors for large and dynamic networks. The reputation mechanism allows node cooperation through the sharing of views about other nodes. The proposed approach exploits information about the behavior of nodes to increase its quality in terms of detection. When classifying the behavior of the nodes, it includes a reputation service where the nodes periodically exchange heartbeat messages.
Additional assumptions for asynchronous systems: Several works have tried to circumvent the impossibility of the consensus in pure asynchronous systems in the presence of failures [19] . Therefore, the challenge is to identify properties that can be satisfied "nearly always" by the underlying asynchronous system enriched by some assumptions which allow an algorithm, for instance Ω (which can then be used to solve consensus in a system with a majority of correct processes) to be implemented during the "periods" in which the properties are satisfied [20] .
The Message Pattern approach does not assume eventual bounds on process and communication delays. In [6] , the authors consider that there is a correct process p and a set Q of f processes (with p / ∈ Q, moreover, Q can contain crashed processes) such that, each time a process q ∈ Q broadcasts a query, it receives a response from p among the first (n − f ) corresponding responses (such a response is called a winning response). Note that this assumption does not prevent message delays from always increasing without bound. This approach has been applied to the construction of a leader protocol.
Aguilera et al. introduce the ♦f −source assumption in [5] aiming at providing communication-efficient leader and consensus protocol implementations. In a system with n nodes and up to f process can crash, a ♦f −source node p is a correct node with f outgoing links that are eventually timely, i.e., there exist t 0 and a bound δ, such that any message sent by p after t 0 on one of these links is received at most δ units of time after it has been sent.
In [7] , the authors define the concept of eventual ♦f −accessibility. A process p is eventual ♦f −accessible if there is a time t 0 such that, at any time t ≥ t 0 , there is a set Q(t) of f processes such that p / ∈ Q(t) and a message broadcast by p at t receives a response from each process of Q(t) by time t + δ (where δ is a bound known by the processes). This approach requires a majority of correct processes. Its interest lies in the fact that the set Q of processes whose responses have to be received in a timely manner is not fixed and can be different at distinct times. The paper also presents a protocol building Ω when there is a process that is ♦f −accessible forever, and all other links are fair-lossy.
In [21] and [22] , the authors propose a model to implement unreliable FDs in dynamic networks with suitable assumptions for such a scenario. The message pattern model establishes conditions on the logical time the messages are delivered by processes. They present a stabilized responsiveness property (SRP ). The property states that there exists a time t after which all nodes of p i 's neighborhood receive, to every of their queries, a response from p i which is always among the α j responses to the query. That is, it denotes the ability of a node to reply to a query among the first nodes. Similarly to the winning channel approach, the response of p i is always a winning response.
Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper we have shown the flexibility capacity of our Impact FD provided by the impact factor and the threshold which enable the user to define the importance (e.g., degree of reliability) of each node and an acceptable margin of failures respectively.
We have defined two properties, P R(IT S p ) and P R(♦IT S p ), which denote the capacity of the Impact FD for accepting different set of responses that lead to a trusted state of the system S as well as the concept of a P S−accessible (resp., ♦P S−accessible) process such that every QU ERY message sent by this process obtains from the beginning (resp., eventually) a set Q of responses that satisfy the degree of confidence in S (threshold S * ). Interestingly, that in both definitions of P S−accessible and ♦P S−accessible, the set Q is not fixed and can be different at distinct times which joins the flexibility property of the Impact FD.
Then, we have presented two algorithms that implement the Impact FD tailored to exploit its flexibility feature. The first algorithm is based on a time-free message pattern approach which waits for responses from α processes or from a set Q of processes whose responses satisfy the threshold S * . The second algorithm assumes that for every query issued by p, the latter can receive timely responses. We have proved that, for both algorithms, if the monitoring process p is P S−accessible (resp., ♦P S−accessible) the system S is always (eventually always) trusted by p.
In the near future, we intend to generalize the trust level calculation as well as its comparison with the threshold. To this end, the T rust level(trusted, S * ) function can perform an operation over the impact factor of the trusted processes other than the sum (e.g., multiplication, average, etc.) and the threshold will not necessary be a lower bound (e.g., upper bound, equality, etc.). For instance, suppose that the impact factor of a node corresponds to the probability that it behaves maliciously. The trust level, in this case, would express the probability that all nodes of the system behave maliciously. Thus, the trust level sum operation would be replaced by multiplication operation and should be smaller than a reliability threshold value;
Another research direction is to render the impact factor dynamic, i.e., the impact factor of a node can vary during execution, depending on the current degree of reliability of the node or its current reputation, its past history of stable/unstable periods, etc.
